Ontological and Epistemological Perspectives on the Subject of Non-Human Legal Entities in the Digital Era

Abstract

The escalating role of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and autonomous digital systems has transcended technological boundaries to enter the realm of fundamental legal doctrine, demanding a critical evaluation of the doctrine of legal subjects, which has long been based on a rigid anthropocentric paradigm. This study aims to establish and reconstruct the ontological and epistemological foundations for the discourse on recognizing non-human entities as legal subjects in the digital age. Using a normative legal research method combined with approaches from the philosophy of law, conceptual analysis, and doctrinal analysis, this study examines two main dimensions. From an ontological perspective, it is found that legal subject status does not absolutely depend on biological existence or innate rational consciousness (natural consciousness), but can be reconceptualized through functional agency and the expansion of the doctrine of legal fiction (fictio iuris), which has historically been applied to legal entities. From an epistemological perspective, the validation and legal recognition of non-human entities require a shift in the instruments of proof, moving from the criterion of moral free will toward the testing of algorithmic transparency, the measurability of action capacity, and the clarity of liability allocation schemes. This study concludes that ontological and epistemological recognition of electronic personhood provides a robust theoretical framework for the formation of an adaptive digital legal regime, without eliminating the position of humans as the holders of the highest ethical and moral sovereignty within the legal order.