

Reconstruction of Constitutional AI Electoral Governance for Election Legitimacy: A Comparison of Indonesia, the United States, and Singapore

Amirullah¹, Sri Rahayu²

¹ Nusa Cendana University, Indonesia

² Brawijaya University, Indonesia

* Correspondence e-mail: amirullah@staf.undana.ac.id

Article history

Submitted: 2026/05/01; Revised: 2026/06/11; Accepted: 2026/07/24

Abstract

Artificial Intelligence (AI) has transformed contemporary political campaigns from communication support tools into algorithmic systems capable of shaping voter preferences through micro-targeting, personalized messaging, and synthetic content such as deepfakes. In Indonesia, this technological development has outpaced the national legal framework. Existing regulations, including Law Number 7 of 2017 on General Elections, the Personal Data Protection Law, and the Information and Electronic Transactions Law, remain fragmented and primarily focus on post-violation enforcement rather than preventive governance of Generative AI and algorithmic political advertising. This study examines the constitutional implications of AI-driven political campaigns for electoral legitimacy, compares regulatory approaches in the United States and Singapore, and proposes an appropriate governance model for Indonesia. Employing normative legal research with statutory, conceptual, comparative, and case approaches, the study finds that AI threatens popular sovereignty, citizens' rights to accurate information, and the principles of free and fair elections. As its principal contribution, the study proposes the Constitutional AI Electoral Governance (CAEG) model, comprising five constitutional pillars to regulate AI while recommending revisions to the Election Law and stronger supervisory authority for the KPU and Bawaslu.

Keywords

Artificial Intelligence; Deepfakes and Electoral Disinformation; Election Legitimacy; Algorithmic Governance; Constitutional AI Electoral Governance



© 2026 by the authors. Submitted for possible open access publication under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY SA) license, <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/>.

INTRODUCTION

The rapid digital transformation of the past two decades has fundamentally reshaped democratic processes by integrating data analytics, algorithms, and Artificial Intelligence (AI) into political communication. According to UNESCO

(2024), digital platforms have replaced traditional mass media as the primary intermediaries of political information, enabling algorithmic curation, audience segmentation, and personalized political messaging. The emergence of Generative AI systems, including GPT, Gemini, and Claude, has further accelerated this transformation by producing highly realistic text, images, audio, and video, creating new opportunities for political communication while simultaneously introducing unprecedented constitutional and legal challenges (Haq et al., 2024).

In electoral contexts, AI has evolved from a campaign support technology into a strategic instrument capable of influencing voter preferences through micro-targeting, behavioral profiling, predictive analytics, and personalized political advertising. As noted by Atar (2024), these capabilities enhance campaign efficiency but also challenge fundamental democratic principles by reducing transparency and increasing algorithmic influence over political decision-making. Thapa (2024) further argues that constitutional concerns arise when citizens are unable to identify whether political messages originate from human actors or AI systems, undermining informed democratic participation.

The proliferation of Generative AI and deepfake technologies has intensified these concerns. Ahmed et al. (2025) emphasize that AI-generated synthetic content enables large-scale dissemination of manipulated political information capable of distorting public perception and weakening electoral legitimacy. Similarly, Łabuz and Nehring (2024) explain that deepfakes generated through advanced machine learning techniques can convincingly fabricate speeches or actions of political candidates, particularly during critical campaign periods when opportunities for verification are limited. In addition, Bender (2022) argues that AI-based manipulation increasingly occurs before election day through algorithmic control of information flows, echo chambers, and predictive targeting, thereby influencing the formation of voters' political preferences rather than merely affecting vote counting.

Despite these developments, Indonesia's legal framework remains fragmented. The Election Law, the Personal Data Protection Law, the ITE Law, and KPU-Bawaslu regulations regulate elections, personal data, electronic information, and campaign procedures separately, without providing an integrated framework for AI governance. As observed by Khairunnisa and Mulyadi (2024), these regulations do not address AI disclosure obligations, synthetic content labeling, algorithmic transparency, or deepfake supervision. Armiwulan et al. (2024) further note that existing personal data regulations fail to govern AI-driven political profiling and micro-targeting, while Paliwang and Swandiani (2025) argue that the ITE regime

remains primarily reactive, focusing on post-violation enforcement rather than preventive regulation of AI-generated political content.

The literature likewise reveals significant research gaps. Chowdhury (2024) finds that existing scholarship predominantly examines AI from the perspectives of political communication or platform governance, whereas Rahman and Anggriawan (2025) emphasize criminal law responses to deepfakes. Few studies integrate constitutional democracy, electoral integrity, and AI governance into a unified legal framework. Responding to this gap, and consistent with the constitutional governance approach proposed by Coglianese and Lobel (2024), this study develops the Constitutional AI Electoral Governance (CAEG) model. By integrating Digital Constitutionalism, Algorithmic Governance, Electoral Integrity, and Constitutional Democracy, the model positions AI as an object of constitutional governance, providing a comprehensive framework to strengthen constitutional rights, democratic accountability, and electoral legitimacy in Indonesia's digital democracy.

METHODS

This study employs prescriptive normative legal research to examine the constitutional implications of the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in political campaigns and to formulate a regulatory framework capable of safeguarding electoral legitimacy in Indonesia. Rather than investigating empirical causal relationships, the research focuses on analyzing legal norms, constitutional principles, doctrines, and concepts governing AI in democratic elections. Following the normative legal research framework proposed by Negara (2023), the study evaluates the adequacy of existing positive law (*ius constitutum*), identifies normative gaps, and formulates recommendations for future legal development (*ius constituendum*) through systematic legal interpretation, legal reasoning, and normative construction.

To achieve these objectives, the research applies four complementary legal approaches. First, the statutory approach examines the consistency between constitutional provisions and legislation governing elections, personal data protection, electronic information, and AI-related policies. The analysis primarily focuses on the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, Law No. 7 of 2017 on General Elections, the Personal Data Protection Law, the Electronic Information and Transactions (ITE) Law, and regulations issued by the General Election Commission (KPU) and the Election Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu). As emphasized by Wulandari (2026), these legal instruments are assessed to determine their capacity to

address emerging challenges posed by Generative AI, deepfakes, synthetic political content, and algorithmic political advertising.

Second, the study adopts a conceptual approach to establish a comprehensive theoretical framework. Drawing upon the concepts of Digital Constitutionalism, Algorithmic Governance, Electoral Integrity, Constitutional Democracy, Constitutional Rights, and Constitutional Resilience, the research explains how AI affects constitutional rights and electoral legitimacy. According to Rohman et al. (2024), integrating these theoretical perspectives enables the formulation of adaptive constitutional governance capable of responding to technological developments while protecting democratic values.

Third, a comparative approach is employed by examining AI regulation in Indonesia, the United States, and Singapore. The United States represents a rights-based regulatory model emphasizing freedom of expression and decentralized governance, whereas Singapore adopts a preventive risk-based approach centered on transparency, accountability, and digital integrity. Consistent with Negara (2023), this comparison aims to identify constitutional principles and regulatory best practices that may be adapted within Indonesia's legal system rather than replicating foreign models. Fourth, the research utilizes a case approach to analyze practical applications of AI during electoral processes. Cases involving Generative AI, deepfakes, AI-powered political chatbots, algorithmic political advertising, and micro-targeting in the United States, Singapore, and Indonesia's 2024 General Election are examined to evaluate how existing legal norms operate in practice. As noted by Budiana et al. (2026), this approach facilitates an assessment of the effectiveness of current legal instruments in addressing rapidly evolving AI technologies.

The research relies on primary, secondary, and tertiary legal materials. Primary materials include constitutional provisions, statutes, AI-related regulations, and international governance instruments. Secondary materials consist of scholarly books, peer-reviewed journal articles, research reports, and official policy documents, while tertiary materials such as legal dictionaries and encyclopedias support conceptual clarification. Legal materials are collected through comprehensive library research and analyzed using qualitative-prescriptive methods involving statutory interpretation, historical interpretation, comparative legal analysis, and structured legal reasoning. Following the methodological guidance of Wulandari (2026), the findings are synthesized to develop the Constitutional AI Electoral Governance (CAEG) model, a constitutional framework designed to

strengthen electoral legitimacy, protect constitutional rights, and promote transparent, accountable, and democratic AI governance in Indonesia.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Constitutional Implications of the Use of Artificial Intelligence in Political Campaigns on the Legitimacy of Elections in Indonesia

The rapid development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) has fundamentally transformed political campaigns, shifting electoral competition from traditional public persuasion toward algorithm-driven strategies based on data analytics, automated decision-making, and personalized political communication. According to De Gregorio and Radu (2022), AI should be understood as a form of private algorithmic power capable of shaping citizens' political preferences through opaque digital systems, thereby directly affecting the exercise of popular sovereignty. This transformation extends the constitutional significance of AI beyond technological innovation into the realm of democratic governance.

From a constitutional perspective, electoral legitimacy depends not only on procedural compliance but also on the integrity of the information environment in which citizens form political choices. As Coglianese and Lobel (2024) argue, constitutional protection in the digital era must encompass the governance of algorithmic systems that influence political communication. In Indonesia, Articles 1(2), 22E, and 28F of the 1945 Constitution guarantee popular sovereignty, democratic elections, and the right to obtain information. However, these guarantees become vulnerable when AI-generated content, algorithmic profiling, and micro-targeting distort citizens' ability to make informed political decisions.

The constitutional risks become more evident through the proliferation of deepfakes and synthetic political content. De Gregorio and Radu (2022) emphasize that AI-generated misinformation blurs the distinction between authentic and fabricated information, while Łabuz and Nehring (2024) note that highly realistic deepfakes threaten free and fair elections by manipulating public perception and undermining trust in democratic institutions. Such technologies affect not only individual rights to accurate information but also the broader legitimacy of electoral processes.

These developments demonstrate that constitutional law must evolve beyond the traditional vertical relationship between the state and citizens. As highlighted by Golia (2024), AI governance requires a constitutional framework capable of regulating algorithmic power exercised by private technology companies. Likewise,

Coglianese and Lobel (2024) argue that constitutional rights increasingly have a horizontal effect, imposing positive obligations on the state to regulate digital platforms whose algorithms shape public discourse. Consequently, AI governance should be grounded in constitutional transparency, algorithmic accountability, human oversight, and the protection of electoral data. Such a framework is essential to balance technological innovation with constitutional rights while preserving electoral integrity and democratic legitimacy in Indonesia's digital democracy.

Table 1. Mapping of Constitutional Risk of the Use of Artificial Intelligence in Political Campaigns on Constitutional Rights and Election Legitimacy in Indonesia

Forms of AI Use in Political Campaigns	Constitutional Risks	Constitutional Rights Affected	Impact on Election Integrity and Legitimacy	Setup Requirements
Deepfake (video, audio, synthetic images)	Manipulation of political reality, public misleading, delegitimization of candidates	Article 28F of the 1945 Constitution (right to obtain information), Article 28E paragraph (3) (freedom to express opinions responsibly), Article 22E (honest and fair elections)	Lowering public trust in political information, influencing voters' choices ahead of voting	Mandatory AI disclosure, digital watermark, rapid response mechanism by KPU-BAWASLU
Political Micro-targeting	Manipulation of political preferences through the exploitation of personal data	Article 28G paragraph (1) (personal protection and privacy), Article 28D paragraph (1) (fair legal certainty)	Political competition becomes unequal, manipulation of voter behavior emerges	Restrictions on the use of personal data for political campaigns, data processing audits
Algorithmic Political Advertising	Discriminatory and non-transparent distribution of political information	Article 28F of the 1945 Constitution, Article 28D paragraph (1)	Inequality of access to political information and reduced quality of public deliberation	Algorithm transparency, digital political ad registration
Political Chatbot	Ambiguity of communicator identity and information accountability	Article 28F of the 1945 Constitution	Voters don't know whether the information comes from humans or AI	The identification obligations of AI chatbots in political communication
Generative AI Content	Massive production of synthetic political content	Article 28F and Article 22E of the 1945 Constitution	Political polarization, information disorder, erosion of election	AI content verification standards and synthetic content

			legitimacy	labeling
Algorithmic Amplification	Strengthening political bias and echo chambers	Article 28E paragraph (3), Article 28F	Lowering the quality of democratic public space	Algorithmic audits and risk mitigation obligations by digital platforms

Source: Researcher

Constitutional risk mapping shows that each use of AI in political campaigns has a different threat character so that it cannot be addressed through a single common legal instrument. Indonesia's regulatory approach that is still based on technology-neutral regulation is not adequate because AI has the ability to generate synthetic content, predict voter behavior, and control the distribution of information automatically. These characteristics pose systemic constitutional risks that go beyond individual violations. Therefore, a special legal regime is needed that regulates the governance of AI in the electoral process to ensure the protection of constitutional rights and electoral integrity (Coglianese & Lobel, 2024).

The mapping shows that the constitutional risks of AI are not only related to the violation of one particular right, but involve the interconnectedness of various constitutional rights. The manipulation of information through deepfakes, for example, does not only concern the right to obtain information based on Article 28F of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, but also has implications for the sovereignty of the people and the principle of honest and fair elections in Article 1 paragraph (2) and Article 22E of the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. Similarly, political micro-targeting not only touches on the privacy aspect, but also has the potential to create inequality in political competition. Therefore, the threat of AI must be understood as a multidimensional issue that connects privacy, freedom of expression, access to information, political equality, and electoral integrity in a single constitutional issue (De Gregorio, 2022).

The findings strengthen the argument that the AI regulatory gap in Indonesia is not only a regulatory gap, but has developed into a constitutional regulatory gap. This condition shows that there is no adequate legal instrument available to fulfill the state's obligation to protect citizens' constitutional rights from the threat of algorithmic power. From the perspective of constitutional governance, the state not only has a negative obligation not to violate the rights of citizens, but also a positive obligation to form preventive regulations. Therefore, the regulation of AI in political

campaigns is not just a policy choice, but a constitutional consequence to safeguard people's sovereignty in a digital democracy (Bender, 2022).

Artificial Intelligence Regulation in Political Campaigns in the United States and Singapore

The rapid adoption of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in political campaigns has encouraged many countries to reform their electoral legal frameworks, although no single regulatory model has emerged. Regulatory approaches are shaped by each country's constitutional tradition, political system, and philosophy of technology governance. As Luna et al. (2024) explain, the United States and Singapore represent two contrasting models: the United States prioritizes freedom of expression and technological innovation through sectoral regulation, while Singapore adopts a preventive, risk-based framework that places electoral integrity at the center of public policy. These differences provide valuable lessons for Indonesia in developing a constitutional framework that balances democratic values with technological advancement. From a comparative legal perspective, Keith (2024) argues that the objective is not to identify a universal regulatory model but to extract constitutional principles capable of managing AI-related risks while preserving innovation and fundamental rights. The principal challenge is to reconcile constitutional freedoms, electoral fairness, and technological development within a coherent legal framework.

The United States illustrates a decentralized governance model. According to Luna et al. (2024), the country has not enacted a comprehensive federal law specifically regulating AI in political campaigns. Instead, governance is achieved through a combination of federal agency policies, state legislation, and administrative guidance, reflecting the federal constitutional structure and the strong protection of political speech under the First Amendment. Consequently, regulatory standards vary across states. The response to the increasing use of Generative AI during the 2024 U.S. presidential election further demonstrates this approach. Dotan (2024) notes that the federal government avoided imposing a blanket prohibition on AI-generated political content. Instead, it emphasized interagency coordination, transparency requirements for synthetic media, and technical standards designed to mitigate risks while preserving innovation. This rights-based governance model seeks to regulate misuse rather than restrict AI technology itself, highlighting a proportional balance between electoral integrity and constitutional freedoms.

The development of electoral practice shows that the United States' sectoral approach also has limitations. The absence of national standards regarding AI content labeling, algorithm transparency, and the use of deepfakes causes voter

protection to depend on individual states' policies. Some states have restricted the spread of misleading AI-based election content, but those regulatory differences have led to legal fragmentation. This condition shows that the decentralistic approach provides room for policy innovation, but at the same time presents challenges in building national standards for the protection of voters' constitutional rights ((NCSL), 2024).

From a constitutional law perspective, the United States regulation shows a constitutional balance between the protection of freedom of expression under the First Amendment and the interest of maintaining the integrity of elections. The state is limited to not widely controlling the truth of political information because it has the potential to contradict the principle of free political speech. Therefore, the approach developed emphasizes transparency, digital literacy, and platform responsibility more than the authority of government censorship. Any restrictions on the use of AI in political communication must still comply with the principles of strict scrutiny and proportionality (Chowdhury, 2024).

In contrast to the United States, Singapore has developed a more preventive regulatory approach by viewing deepfakes and manipulated digital content as threats to electoral integrity. This approach is realized through the Elections (Integrity of Online Advertising) (Amendment) Act 2024 which takes effect from January 22, 2025. The regulation amends the Parliamentary Elections Act 1954 and the Presidential Elections Act 1991 by prohibiting online campaign ads that use manipulative AI content that realistically depicts candidates doing or conveying something that never happened. In addition, this rule gives the Returning Officer the authority to order the removal of infringing content during the election period (Republic of Singapore Government Gazette, 2024).

Singapore builds regulations based on the principles of precautionary principle and preventive governance. The government considers that damage to election legitimacy due to the spread of deepfakes cannot always be recovered through a clarification mechanism after the content is circulated. Therefore, regulations are focused on prevention from the beginning by providing administrative authority to stop the spread of manipulative content during election periods. This approach shows a shift in orientation from post-hoc enforcement to ex ante constitutional protection, i.e. the protection of voters' rights before the impact of information manipulation affects the formation of political choices ((MDDI), 2024).

Nonetheless, the Singapore model has also faced criticism for giving the government broad administrative authority in determining content that is

categorized as digital manipulation. From a constitutional law perspective, this authority has the potential to cause executive overreach if it is not accompanied by an adequate judicial supervision and transparency mechanism. Therefore, the effectiveness of Singapore's regulations must remain within the framework of the rule of law so that the protection of electoral integrity does not turn into excessive restrictions on freedom of expression ((NIST), 2024).

When compared systematically, the main difference between the United States and Singapore lies not in the recognition of AI risks, but in the regulatory philosophy used. The United States applies a rights-based governance approach by placing freedom of expression as the basis for restricting the use of AI, while Singapore uses a risk-based governance approach that emphasizes preventive protection of election integrity. These differences suggest that the design of AI regulations is heavily influenced by the way each country balances the protection of individual rights and the public interest within a constitutional framework ((MDDI), 2024).

For Indonesia, the two models provide complementary normative lessons in formulating AI governance in elections. The United States' approach emphasizes the importance of protecting freedom of expression and political participation, while Singapore points to the need for preventive mechanisms to safeguard the integrity of elections from the abuse of AI. Therefore, Indonesia does not need to adopt one of the models in full, but builds a hybrid constitutional approach that combines the protection of constitutional rights with risk-based AI governance as the basis for the establishment of Constitutional AI Electoral Governance.

Constitutional AI Electoral Governance as an AI Regulatory Model in Political Campaigns in Indonesia

The analysis of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in political campaigns demonstrates that Indonesia's legal framework requires more than incremental regulatory reform. The core challenge is the absence of a constitutional paradigm capable of integrating digital technological development with the protection of constitutional rights during elections. Existing legal instruments, including the Election Law, the ITE Law, the Personal Data Protection Law, and regulations issued by the KPU and Bawaslu, remain fragmented and reactive, leaving Indonesia without a comprehensive framework for AI governance. As Keith (2024) argues, AI regulation must adopt a preventive approach that addresses the entire technological lifecycle, from system design and data collection to deployment and dissemination. Comparative experiences reinforce this conclusion. Luna et al. (2024) explain that the United States prioritizes freedom of expression through a rights-based approach but experiences

fragmented oversight, whereas Singapore adopts preventive regulation that effectively limits digital manipulation while raising concerns about executive discretion. These contrasting models indicate that constitutional governance should balance civil liberties with electoral integrity rather than privilege one over the other.

Accordingly, this study proposes the Constitutional AI Electoral Governance (CAEG) model, which treats AI as an object of constitutional governance subject to the principles of popular sovereignty, the rule of law, human rights, and democratic elections. Consistent with the OECD (2022) framework on trustworthy AI, CAEG regulates the entire AI lifecycle, including voter data processing, algorithmic decision-making, political content generation, dissemination, and post-election oversight. The model is founded on three principal constitutional pillars. Constitutional transparency, supported by UNESCO (2023), requires disclosure and labeling of AI-generated political content to protect citizens' rights to reliable information. Algorithmic accountability, emphasized by the Council of Europe (2024), extends legal responsibility to AI developers, political actors, and digital platforms. Finally, electoral data sovereignty, reflecting the European Data Protection Board (2024), recognizes voter data as constitutionally protected information requiring informed consent, limited processing purposes, and strict public oversight. Collectively, these principles establish a constitutional framework for safeguarding electoral legitimacy in the digital era.

The fourth principle is human constitutional oversight, which is the obligation to ensure that the use of AI in the electoral process remains under human supervision. AI cannot replace the role of public authorities in determining the direction of the democratic process. Oversight is carried out through independent audits, objection mechanisms, civil society oversight, and judicial testing of the use of AI that has the potential to violate constitutional rights. Thus, AI is placed as an instrument supporting democracy, not as a political decision-maker (Europe, 2024).

The fifth principle is adaptive constitutional regulation, which is the ability of the law to adapt to the ever-changing development of AI technology. Regulations that are too specific to a particular technology risk losing relevance when new innovations emerge. Therefore, CAEG emphasizes the establishment of periodic evaluation mechanisms, regulatory sandboxes, ethical guidelines, and adaptive authority for the KPU and Bawaslu in responding to AI developments. This approach allows for a balance between legal certainty and regulatory flexibility in dealing with digital technology dynamics (Yeung, 2020).

These five principles show that legal reconstruction through the CAEG model is not directed at banning the use of AI, but at the establishment of constitutional governance that ensures that the technology remains in line with democratic values. Thus, CAEG is not only a theoretical concept, but also a normative framework that can be used as a basis for policy formulation, revision of the Election Law, and the formation of technical regulations by election organizers.

This research produced the Constitutional AI Electoral Governance (CAEG) model as a new framework for regulating AI in political campaigns in Indonesia. This model departs from the finding that the current election law does not view AI as a form of algorithmic normative power that is able to influence the formation of citizens' political preferences. Existing regulations still focus on the actions of legal subjects, while algorithmic mechanisms that produce, distribute, and amplify political information have not yet become the object of regulation. As a result, constitutional protections work more after the emergence of negative impacts, rather than from the risk formation stage. Therefore, CAEG offers a paradigm shift by placing AI as an object of constitutional control that must be subject to the principles of a democratic state of law. (Leslie et al., 2021)

Based on this construction, this study develops three main dimensions in the CAEG model. The first dimension is constitutional legitimacy, which is the principle that the use of AI in political campaigns must strengthen, not replace, the process of forming citizens' political will. The second dimension is institutional accountability, which is the formation of an accountability system that is no longer only charged to election participants. The third dimension is adaptive constitutional regulation, which is a regulatory mechanism that is able to adapt to the development of AI without always having to change laws.

The conceptual advantage of CAEG over emerging models lies in its integration of constitutional law principles into AI governance. Most AI governance models are oriented towards data protection issues, technology ethics, or sectoral risk mitigation. On the contrary, the model offered by this study makes the legitimacy of democracy the center of regulation. Thus, the success of AI regulation is measured not only by the reduction of technology abuse, but also by its ability to maintain the quality of the implementation of people's sovereignty, ensure the equality of electoral competition, and protect citizens' constitutional rights in the overall democratic process.

CONCLUSION

This study concludes that Artificial Intelligence (AI) in political campaigns has significant constitutional implications for electoral legitimacy in Indonesia. First, AI has evolved into a form of private algorithmic power that influences citizens' political preferences, affecting popular sovereignty, democratic elections, and the constitutional right to accurate information. Existing Indonesian regulations, including the Election Law, Personal Data Protection Law, and ITE Law, remain fragmented and are not equipped to address Generative AI, deepfakes, micro-targeting, or algorithmic political advertising. Second, the comparative analysis demonstrates that the United States adopts a rights-based approach emphasizing freedom of expression but facing regulatory fragmentation, while Singapore employs a preventive risk-based model that effectively limits online manipulation yet raises concerns regarding executive oversight. These approaches provide complementary lessons rather than a single model for Indonesia. Third, this research proposes the Constitutional AI Electoral Governance (CAEG) model as a hybrid constitutional framework built on five pillars: constitutional transparency, algorithmic accountability, electoral data sovereignty, human constitutional oversight, and adaptive constitutional regulation. The study's novelty lies in repositioning AI governance as a constitutional law issue rather than merely a technological or data protection concern. It recommends revising Indonesia's Election Law, strengthening the supervisory authority of the KPU and Bawaslu, and empirically testing the CAEG model in future electoral contexts.

REFERENCES

- (MDDI), M. of D. D. and I. (2024). *New Legal Measures to Uphold Integrity of Online Advertising During Elections*. https://www.mddi.gov.sg/newsroom/new-legal-measures-uphold-integrity-online-advertising-elections/?utm_source=chatgpt.com
- (NCSL), N. C. of S. L. (2024). *Artificial Intelligence 2024 Legislation*. <https://www.ncsl.org/technology-and-communication/artificial-intelligence-2024-legislation>
- (NIST), N. I. of S. and T. (2024). *Opening Speech by Minister Josephine Teo at the Second Reading of the ELIONA Bill*. https://www.mddi.gov.sg/newsroom/opening-speech-by-minister-josephine-teo-at-the-second-reading-of-the-eliona-bill/?utm_source=chatgpt.com
- Ahmed, S., Chandra, S., Jain, A., Wongmahesak, K., & Singh, B. (2025). Impact of AI-Generated Misinformation on Electoral Integrity and Public Trust. In *Democracy and Democratization in the Age of AI* (hal. 57–72). IGI Global. <https://doi.org/10.4018/979-8-3693-8749-8.ch004>

- Armiwulan, H., Rahman, R. A., Prabowo, V. N., & Hajdú, J. (2024). Artificial Intelligence and Its Challenges To Elections In Indonesia: A Legal Analysis. *Jambura Law Review*, 6(2), 264–285. <https://doi.org/10.33756/jlr.v6i2.24243>
- Atar, N. (2024). *Artificial Intelligence and the Transformation in Political Communication and Campaigns* (hal. 461–490). <https://doi.org/10.4018/979-8-3693-7235-7.ch019>
- Bender, S. (2022). Algorithmic Elections. *Michigan Law Review*, (121.3), 489. <https://doi.org/10.36644/mlr.121.3.algorithmic>
- Budiana, B., Maulana, G. A. S., Anugrah, D., Dani, M., & Sondakh, E. (2026). Yurisometry as an Alternative Approach in Normative Legal Research in Indonesia: A Conceptual Study. *Indonesian Journal of Law and Economics Review*, 21(2). <https://doi.org/10.21070/ijler.v21i2.1492>
- Chowdhury, R. (2024). AI-fuelled election campaigns are here — where are the rules? *Nature*, 628(8007), 237–237. <https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-024-00995-9>
- Coglianesi, C., & Lobel, O. (2024). Algorithmic Administration as Constitutional Governance. In *The Oxford Handbook of Digital Constitutionalism*. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198877820.013.27>
- De Gregorio, G. (2022). *Digital Constitutionalism in Europe*. Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009071215>
- De Gregorio, G., & Radu, R. (2022). Digital constitutionalism in the new era of Internet governance. *International Journal of Law and Information Technology*, 30(1), 68–87. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ijlit/eaac004>
- Dotan, R. (2024). US regulation of artificial intelligence. In *The Elgar Companion to Applied AI Ethics* (hal. 153–178). Edward Elgar Publishing. <https://doi.org/10.4337/9781803928241.00015>
- Europe, C. of. (2024). *The Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence*. Council of Europe. <https://www.coe.int/en/web/artificial-intelligence/the-framework-convention-on-artificial-intelligence>
- European Data Protection Board. (2024). Opinion 28/2024 on certain data protection aspects related to the processing of personal data in the context of AI models. *Opinion 28/2024*, (December).
- Golia, A. J. (2024). Critique of digital constitutionalism: Deconstruction and reconstruction from a societal perspective. *Global Constitutionalism*, 13(3), 488–518. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S2045381723000126>
- Haq, E.-U., Zhu, Y., Hui, P., & Tyson, G. (2024). History in Making: Political Campaigns in the Era of Artificial Intelligence-Generated Content. *Companion Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2024*, 1115–1118. <https://doi.org/10.1145/3589335.3652000>
- Keith, A. J. (2024). Governance of artificial intelligence in Southeast Asia. *Global Policy*, 15(5), 937–954. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.13458>
- Khairunnisa, P., & Mulyadi, M. (2024). Implementation of Artificial Intelligence in Political Advertising in Indonesia. *Riwayat: Educational Journal of History and Humanities*, 7(4), 2989–3000. <https://doi.org/10.24815/jr.v7i4.42906>

- Łabuz, M., & Nehring, C. (2024). On the way to deep fake democracy? Deep fakes in election campaigns in 2023. *European Political Science*, 23(4), 454–473. <https://doi.org/10.1057/s41304-024-00482-9>
- Leslie, D., Burr, C., Aitken, M., Katell, M., Briggs, M., & Rincon, C. (2021). Human Rights, Democracy, and the Rule of Law Assurance Framework for AI Systems: A proposal prepared for the Council of Europe’s Ad hoc Committee on Artificial Intelligence. *The Alan Turing Institute*. <https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.5981676>
- Luna, J., Tan, I., Xie, X., & Jiang, L. (2024). Navigating Governance Paradigms: A Cross-Regional Comparative Study of Generative AI Governance Processes & Principles. *Proceedings of the AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society*, 7, 917–931. <https://doi.org/10.1609/aies.v7i1.31692>
- Negara, T. A. S. (2023). Normative Legal Research in Indonesia: Its Origins and Approaches. *Audito Comparative Law Journal (ACLJ)*, 4(1), 1–9. <https://doi.org/10.22219/aclj.v4i1.24855>
- OECD. (2022). *OECD Framework for the Classification of AI systems* (OECD Digital Economy Papers, Vol. 323). <https://doi.org/10.1787/cb6d9eca-en>
- Paliwang, A. N. A. A., & Swandiani, N. L. P. E. (2025). Artificial Intelligence Regulation in the Protection of Democracy: A Legal Analysis of Political Deepfakes and Disinformation in the 2024 Election. *Hakim: Jurnal Ilmu Hukum dan Sosial*, 3(4), 1433–1455. <https://doi.org/10.51903/rx25ap29>
- Rahman, R. A., & Anggriawan, R. (2025). Deepfake and Election Crimes: Comparative Perspectives from Indonesia, India, Pakistan, and the U.S. *Comparative Law Review*, 7(2), 132–146. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.18196/iclr.v7i2.26337>
- Republic of Singapore Government Gazette, No 34 of 2024, 1 (2024).
- Rohman, M. M., Mu’minin, N., Masuwd, M., & Elihami, E. (2024). Methodological Reasoning Finds Law Using Normative Studies (Theory, Approach and Analysis of Legal Materials). *MAQASIDI: Jurnal Syariah dan Hukum*, 4(2), 204–221. <https://doi.org/10.47498/maqasidi.v4i2.3379>
- Thapa, J. (2024). The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Elections. *International Journal For Multidisciplinary Research*, 6(2). <https://doi.org/10.36948/ijfmr.2024.v06i02.17524>
- UNESCO. (2023). Guidelines for regulating digital platforms: A multistakeholder approach to safeguarding freedom of expression and access to information. *Unesco*, 1–28.
- UNESCO. (2024). *Pedoman Tata Kelola Platform Digital: Melindungi kebebasan berekspresi dan akses informasi melalui pendekatan multipemangku kepentingan*. UNESCO. <https://doi.org/10.58338/DTVR1904>
- Wulandari, P. (2026). Normative Legal Research Methodology from the Experts’ Perspective: A Comparative Analysis of Concepts and Approaches. *Archipel: Journal of Indonesian Interdisciplinary Studies*, 1(6), 12–25. <https://doi.org/10.65739/archipel.v1i6.34>

Yeung, K. (2020). Recommendation of the Council on Artificial Intelligence (OECD).
International Legal Materials, 59(1), 27–34. <https://doi.org/10.1017/ilm.2020.5>